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TWO SIDES OF A "SARGASSO SEA": SUCCESSIVE
PROSECUTION FOR THE "SAME OFFENCE" IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
Lissa Griffin *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution com-
mands that "no person shall... be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. .. ."' The origin of this
clause dates back to Roman times.2 Nevertheless, the double
jeopardy protection is "one of the least understood and, in recent
years, one of the most frequently litigated provisions of the Bill of
Rights."3 Indeed, despite the straightforward language of the
clause itself, Chief Justice Rehnquist has characterized the Su-
preme Court of the United States's double jeopardy jurisprudence
as "a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the
most intrepid judicial navigator."4
In fact, that is so. The Supreme Court's double jeopardy cases
are doctrinally inconsistent and analytically confusing, and the
results are often unprincipled. Indeed, in no other area of consti-
• Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A., University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1972; Law Clerkship pursuant to Rule 520.5 of the Rules of the New
York State Court of Appeals, 1973-1977. The author wishes to thank Professor Bennett
L. Gershman for his critique of this article. The author also wishes to thank the Pace
University School of Law Faculty Research Fund and the Pace London Program for their
financial support during the preparation of this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See George C. Thomas III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 827, 836-37 (1988). For a more thorough treatment of the history of double jeopardy
see JAY A. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY
1-37 (1969).
3. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
4. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). "Sargasso" is defined as "a
mass of floating vegetation." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1043 (1988).
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tutional jurisprudence has the Court so frequently overruled or
substantially modified recently created doctrine.
The principal confusion centers on the concept of "same of-
fence." The Court has used three different approaches to inter-
preting the meaning of this term: a "same-elements" test,5 a
"same-conduct" test,' and a "same transaction" test.7 The selec-
tion of a particular test is important because each test either ex-
pands or contracts the protection against prosecutorial manipula-
tion in the charging process, and thereby affords a defendant
protection against repeated prosecution for alleged criminal con-
duct.
The narrowest approach adopted by the Court is the so-called
"same-elements" test.' Under this test, a court examines the
statutory definition of the crimes at issue to determine if they
have the same elements.9 If all of the elements of one crime are
contained within the elements of another crime, the crimes con-
stitute the same offense.' ° For example, armed robbery and rob-
bery would be the same offense, because robbery has no element
that is not contained in armed robbery. By the same analysis,
armed robbery and bank robbery are not the same offense be-
cause each one has an element that the other does not have: one
requires the defendant to be armed, and the other requires that
the defendant rob a bank. The "same-elements" test offers a de-
fendant the narrowest protection against repeated prosecutions,
because it permits a prosecutor to prosecute a defendant follow-
ing an initial prosecution so long as the crimes have different
elements, even though they are based on exactly the same facts."
Piecemeal litigation is still permitted.
The Court has also adopted a much broader approach to the
definition of "same offence" by applying the so-called "same-
conduct" test.12 This test does not examine statutory elements,
5. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993).
6. Id. at 697.
7. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see
also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (objecting to
denial of certiorari).







but rather examines the conduct underlying charges alleged in
two proceedings. 3 Under this test, even if the two charges have
different elements, a second prosecution is barred if, in order to
prove the defendant's guilt at a second proceeding, the prosecu-
tion would be required to prove a crime for which the defendant
has already been convicted or acquitted. 4 For example, if a de-
fendant has been convicted of armed robbery and is later charged
with bank robbery based on the same criminal transaction, the
second prosecution would be barred if the prosecution had to
prove the same robbery twice. The "same-conduct" test is a
broader protection against reprosecution because it focuses on the
defendant's actual conduct and what will be proven at each prose-
cution, rather than on the statutory elements of crimes."5 Piece-
meal litigation is thus more effectively prevented.
Finally, at least two Supreme Court justices have interpreted
"same offence" to mean "same transaction." 6 Under this test,
which was endorsed by Justices Brennan and Marshall but has
never been adopted by the Court, all crimes arising out of a single
criminal transaction are deemed to be the same. 7 Thus, for ex-
ample, if a defendant enters a bank, displays a gun, steals money,
and assaults a guard in the process, the armed robbery, bank
robbery, larceny, and assault violations he could be charged with
all would be considered the same offense and would be required
to be charged and tried together. This test is the broadest double
jeopardy protection against piecemeal litigation.
The Court's difficulty in defining "same offence" consistently is
not entirely surprising. There is very little historical evidence of
the Framers' intention in using that term." Existing at that time
were the common law English doctrines of autrefois acquit and
autrefois convict, which clearly were intended to be included in




16. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17. Id.
18. Susan R. Klein, Double Jeopardy's Demise, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1002 (2000) (re-
viewing GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW (1998)).
19. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). Under these common law pleas, dis-
cussed at length infra Part II.A.2 and accompanying text, a second prosecution was barred
for any offense of which the defendant had previously been convicted or acquitted, with
"offense" being defined as the same offense in law and fact.
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problems faced by the modern Court in defining the scope of this
protection were not present when the Constitution was ratified,
because at that time there were very few statutory crimes.2° So,
because criminal conduct was defined by only a small number of
statutory crimes, the "same-elements" test, the "same-conduct"
test, and the common law pleas were virtually synonymous. For
example, if a defendant hit someone over the head with a gun and
stole his money, he would be charged with robbery; there was no
option to charge him with robbery, possession of a weapon, and
larceny. In this circumstance, the term "same offence" was proba-
bly intended to "[prevent] the government from recharging a de-
fendant with a particular theft because it was dissatisfied with an
acquittal on that theft."
21
However, over the last two hundred years this simple system of
criminal charging has undergone drastic changes. The number of
crimes has increased, many crimes overlap, and there has been a
huge proliferation of government agencies with the power to
prosecute. These developments have seriously increased the risk
that a defendant could be subjected to multiple prosecutions for
the same act and have complicated the search for a definition of
"same offence" that would protect the interests underlying the
double jeopardy clause.
It is against this background that the Court has struggled to
define the term "same offence." Initially the Court adopted the
"same-elements" test,22 then moved gradually toward articulating
a "same-conduct" test, which it ultimately adopted.23 However,
the Court quickly overruled itself, disavowed this new test, and
returned to the "same-elements" test.24 Having re-settled on this
narrow test, the Court is still divided about how to apply it, creat-
ing substantial confusion in the lower federal courts.25
20. See id.
21. Klein, supra note 18, at 1002.
22. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
23. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510, 521 (1990).
24. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704-05, 711 (1993).
25. Compare United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 2001) (requiring
examination of indictments), and Sharpton v. Turner, 264 F.2d 1284, 1288 (2d Cir. 1992)
(applying a similar test), with United States v. Arlt, 252 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001)
(examining statutory definition of the relevant changes rather than allegations of the in-
dictment), and United States v. Liller, 999 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying the "same-
elements" test to allegations of the indictment).
[Vol. 37:471
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Part of the Supreme Court's difficulty may arise from its exclu-
sive focus on the Double Jeopardy Clause as the sole constitu-
tional protection against successive prosecution. 26 The availability
of other constitutional protections has largely been ignored. How-
ever, the Due Process Clause appears to offer protection against
arbitrary or unfair prosecutorial manipulation of the charging
process. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized due process
protection against one type of improperly motivated reprosecu-
tion-cases in which the prosecution retaliates against a defen-
dant for invoking his or her constitutionally guaranteed proce-
dural rights.2' The Court has not applied this protection where
the prosecutor's motivation is to harass, oppress, or get a second
chance at conviction.29 On the other hand, several state courts
have recognized and invoked an inherent judicial power to bar
vexatious or unfair reprosecution. °
The approach by the United Kingdom to successive prosecution
for the same offense offers an important contrast. The United
Kingdom's definition of "same offence" is analytically consistent
and doctrinally sound. English courts apply the same narrow le-
gal protection against double jeopardy under the doctrines of au-
trefois acquit and autrefois convict, as does the U.S. Supreme
Court.31 However, this core "same-elements" rule is supplemented
by a broad judicial discretion to bar criminal proceedings when a
successive prosecution would constitute an "abuse of process."32
Indeed, prosecution of a defendant in the United Kingdom for dif-
ferent offenses based on the same conduct as in a prior prosecu-
tion is presumptively improper as vexatious and harassing, and,
in the absence of special circumstances, usually will be forbid-
den.33 A second prosecution for a different offense based on sepa-
26. See e.g., Dixon, 509 U.S. at 711; Grady, 495 U.S. at 516-23; Blockburger, 284 U.S.
at 304.
27. For a concise, complete, and articulate discussion of a supplemental due process
protection against successive prosecution, see Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law
Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807 (1997).
28. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969).
29. See infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A-2d 321 (Pa. 1992).
31. See, e.g., Connelly v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [19641 A.C. 1254 (1963), discussed
infra Part III.B.1.
32. Id.
33. R. v. Beedie, [19981 Q.B. 356 (Eng. C.A. 1997). Moreover, there is an even stronger
presumption against a second prosecution where the later offense is an aggravated form of
2003]
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rate facts may also be prohibited under the abuse of process doc-
trine, but the burden of proof to demonstrate unfairness in this
circumstance remains on the defendant.34
Part II of this article analyzes the U. S. constitutional law in-
terpreting the concept of "same offence." Included is a survey of
the Supreme Court's attempts to interpret constitutional text in
order to provide adequate protection for the underlying double
jeopardy interest against vexatious reprosecutions, which have
frequently produced inconsistent and illogical results. Part III of
this article analyzes U.K. law relating to the concept of "same of-
fence," where the same narrow double jeopardy protection
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court is supplemented with a broad
discretion to prevent unfair successive prosecution that consti-
tutes an abuse of process. Part IV draws lessons from a compari-
son of U.S. and U.K. law that might serve to rationalize and clar-
ify the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence by supplementing the
narrow same-elements interpretation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause with a due process or supervisory-power protection
against oppressive multiple prosecutions.
II. UNITED STATES
A. The "Same-Elements" Test
1. Blockburger v. United States
In Blockburger v. United States,3" the Supreme Court ad-
dressed for the first time the double jeopardy standard for deter-
mining whether two offenses are the "same offence." In Block-
burger, the defendant was convicted of two separate offenses: (1)
a lesser charge that previously resulted in acquittal or conviction. See R. v. Elrington
[1861] 1 B. & S. 688, 696 ("[Whether a party accused of a minor offence is acquitted or
convicted, he shall not be charged again on the same facts in a more aggravated form.");
see also R. v. Forest of Dean Justices, (19901 R.T.R. 228, 239 (referring to the "almost in-
variable [I rule that where a person is tried on a lesser offense he is not to be tried again
on the same facts for a more serious offense").
34. Hui Chi-Ming v. R., [1992] 1 A.C. 34, 57 (P.C. 1991) (appeal taken from Hong
Kong).
35. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
[Vol. 37:471
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selling drugs without a written order;36 and (2) selling drugs not
in the original stamped package.37 The issue for the Court was
whether the defendant could be given consecutive jail sentences
for these two crimes.. The Court held that when the same con-
duct or transaction establishes a violation of two statutory provi-
sions, the offenses are not the same offense if "each statute re-
quires proof of an additional fact which the other does not ....
In Blockburger, each statutory offense had an element that the
other did not.4" The first offense included the element of the sale
of drugs "not in pursuance of a written order," and the second of-
fense included as an element the sale of drugs "not in or from the
original stamped package."41 Accordingly, the Court held that the
imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate the Fifth
Amendment.42 In short, Blockburger limited the concept of "same
offence" in the Double Jeopardy Clause to the statutory definition
of the crime as enacted by the legislature.
2. Lesser Included Offenses
In Brown v. Ohio,44 the Court expanded the Blockburger defini-
36. Id. at 301; see also Harrison Narcotic Act, Pub. L. No. 63-223, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785,
786 (1914), amended by Pub. L. No. 65-254, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057, 1131 (1919).
37. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at ' 301.
38. Id. at 304.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 301.
42. See id. at 304-05.
43. Contradicting the lesser included offense rule, a defendant may be charged with
homicide where he or she has previously been acquitted or convicted of any lesser included
offenses of assault or attempted murder where the victim dies after the first conviction or
acquittal. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912). Technically, of course, this violates
the Blockburger "same-elements" test. The same definition of "same offence," and thus the
same double jeopardy protection, applies in each case. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166
(1977). Parenthetically, under the Blockburger test, it does not matter which charge is
tried first and which is tried second; nor does it matter whether the defendant has been
acquitted or convicted in the first proceeding. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. This
makes no logical sense for two reasons. Although it could be argued that under the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the acquitted defendant is entitled to greater protection against reprose-
cution because of the risk of a wrongful conviction, the Blockburger test is neutral on this
question. See id. Moreover, it is permissible to try a defendant first for the greater offense,
and, if he is acquitted, prohibit successive prosecution of a lesser offense, even though an
acquittal could have been based on the absence of the aggravating element.
44., 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
2003]
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tion of "same offence" to encompass lesser included offenses.45 In
Brown, the defendant was first charged with joyriding, and later
charged with stealing an automobile.4" The existing Ohio statute
defined "joyriding" as "tak[ing], operat[ing], or keep[ing] any mo-
tor vehicle without the consent of its owner."47 The Ohio Court of
Appeals distinguished this joyriding offense from the separate
charge of stealing an automobile, which it defined as "'operating a
motor vehicle without the consent of the owner... [with] in-
tent... to permanently deprive the owner of possession.' 48 In
Brown, joyriding was a lesser included offense of the stealing
charge because it contained no additional elements; for the same
reason, the two were the "same offence" under Blockburger.49 Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that the successive prosecution of the
two crimes violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. °
In support of its extension of "same offence" to offenses that
clearly differ in form, the Court distinguished the role of the dou-
ble jeopardy guarantee in Blockburger's multiple punishment
context from its role in the Brown context of preventing succes-
sive prosecutions.5' The Court explained that in Blockburger, its
role was to determine legislative intent, while in Brown its goal
was to provide finality.52 Thus, the Court held:
The Blockburger test is not the only standard for determining
whether successive prosecutions impermissibly involve the same of-
fense. Even if two offenses are sufficiently different to permit the
imposition of consecutive sentences, successive prosecutions will be
45. Id. at 168-69.
46. Id. at 162-63.
47. Id. at 162 n.1 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4549.04(D) (West 1973) (repealed
1974)).
48. Id. at 163 (quoting Ohio Court of Appeals).
49. Id. at 167.
50. Id. at 170.
51. Id. at 166.
52. Id. at 165.
Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role
of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not
exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the
same offense. Where successive prosecutions are at stake, the guarantee
serves a "constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit." That
policy protects the accused from attempts to relitigate the facts underlying a
prior acquittal, and from attempts to secure additional punishment after a
prior conviction and sentence.
Id. at 165-66 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 37:471
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barred in some circumstances where the second prosecution requires
relitigation of factual issues already resolved by the first.
53
The Court cited Ashe v. Swenson54 and In re Nielsen55 as au-
thority for the proposition that offenses can be the "same" for suc-
cessive prosecution purposes even though they would be separate
offenses under Blockburger.56 In Ashe, the Court held that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel was included within the Fifth
Amendment double jeopardy guarantee, thus barring relitigation
of an issue of ultimate fact determined in a prior proceeding. 7 In
Nielsen, the Court sustained a plea of autrefois convict, holding
that a conviction of cohabiting with two wives barred a subse-
quent prosecution for adultery with one of them.5" The second
charge of cohabitation would not have been barred under Block-
burger, because each offense contained an element that the other
did not.59 Nevertheless, the Court construed the goal of the co-
habitation statute to prohibit polygamy, so that the adultery was
an "incident and part of the unlawful cohabitation" for which the
defendant had already been convicted."0 Accordingly, the Court
held that the two charges were the "same" and sustained the plea
of autrefois convict."
B. The "Same-Conduct" Test
1. Origins of the Test
In Harris v. Oklahoma,62 the Court broadened the concept of
"same offence," this time beyond the inclusion of lesser offenses.6
53. Id. at 166-167 n.6.
54. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
55. 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
56. Brown, 432 U.S. at 167 n.6.
57. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 442-46.
58. 131 U.S. at 190-91. Cohabitation is committed if there is a "living or dwelling to-
gether as husband and wife." Id. at 186 (quoting In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887)).
59. Id. at 180, 185-86. Conviction for adultery required proof that the defendant was
married to another, while conviction for cohabitation did not. Id. at 180. Conversely, con-
viction for cohabitation required proof that the defendant lived with more than one woman
at the same time, while conviction for adultery did not. Id. at 185-86.
60. Id. at 187.
61. Id.
62. 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
63. See In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. at 188.
2003]
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The defendant was convicted of felony murder based on robbery
with firearms and was then indicted and convicted for robbery
with firearms based on the same conduct.64 The two charges were
not the same under Brown because, by statutory definition, felony
murder does not necessarily include the element of robbery with
firearms.65 Felony murder merely requires the commission of any
one of several enumerated felonies; moreover, robbery with a
firearm does not require a death.66 Thus, each crime contained an
element the other did not, and could be successively prosecuted.67
However, the Court held that, "[w]hen... conviction of a greater
crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser
crime, robbery with firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater
one."
68
The Court explained that the second prosecution was barred
because the State conceded that the defendant's robbery with
firearms must be proved at the trial for felony murder in order to
obtain a conviction.69 Thus, the Court looked not at the statutory
definitions of the two crimes, which would have permitted succes-
sive prosecution for essentially the same conduct, but at the facts
that would be proved at the two proceedings."
Three years later in Illinois v. Vitale,71 the Court took another
step toward the adoption of a broad "same-conduct" test. In Vi-
tale, a police officer issued a traffic citation to the defendant for
failure to reduce speed after the defendant caused a fatal car ac-
cident.72 He was later convicted and fined on this charge. Subse-
quently, he was charged with involuntary manslaughter based on
his failure to reduce speed.73 On appeal, the Court held that the
second prosecution was not barred under the "same-elements"
test because the charge of involuntary manslaughter included an
64. Harris, 433 U.S. at 682.
65. Id.
66. See Harris v. State, 555 P.2d 76, 80-81 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
67. Harris, 433 U.S. at 683.
68. Id. at 682-83.
69. Id. at 683 (quoting Nielsen's language that a prosecution for a crime that includes
various incidents bars a second prosecution for "one of those incidents.").
70. See id.
71. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
72. Id. at 411.
73. Id. at 412-13, 412 n.2.
[Vol. 37:471
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element-causing death-which the failure to reduce speed of-
fense did not.74 Conversely, the failure to reduce speed offense in-
cluded an element-failure to slow a vehicle-that was not en-
compassed within an involuntary manslaughter charge.75
However, consistent with the Harris Court's focus on the facts to
be proven at the second trial, the Court remanded the case and
suggested that the second prosecution would be barred if the
prosecution was going to prove manslaughter by proving a failure
to slow the vehicle.76
[Ilt may be that to sustain its manslaughter case the State may find
it necessary to prove a failure to slow or to rely on conduct necessar-
ily involving such failure; it may concede as much prior to trial. In
that case, because Vitale has already been convicted for conduct that
is a necessary element of the more serious crime for which he has
been charged, his claim of double jeopardy would be substantial un-
der Brown [v. Ohio] and our later decision in Harris v. Oklahoma.
77
2. Disavowal of the "Same-Elements" Test
The case envisioned in Vitale was presented in Grady v. Cor-
bin.78 In Grady, the defendant drove his car across a double yel-
low line, injuring one person and killing another. 79 The defendant
was served with two traffic tickets charging him with driving
while intoxicated"0 and failing to keep right of the median.81 The
defendant pleaded guilty to the two offenses, was sentenced to
pay a $350 fine, and had his license revoked for six months.82
Grady was thereafter indicted for "reckless manslaughter, sec-
ond-degree vehicular manslaughter, and criminally negligent
homicide . ".8.."3 When the prosecution conceded that to prove the
charges it would rely on "(1) operating a motor vehicle on a public
74. See id. at 416-17.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 420-21.
77. Id. at 420.
78. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
79. Id. at 511.
80. Id.; see also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192(3) (Consol. 1992).
81. Grady, 495 U.S. at 511; see also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1120(a) (Consol. 1992).
82. Grady, 495 U.S. at 512-13.
83. Id. at 513. These charges were for causing the death. Id. He was also indicted for
third degree reckless assault for injuring the other passenger, as well as driving while in-
toxicated. Id.
20031
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highway in an intoxicated condition, (2) failing to keep right of
the median, and (3) driving approximately 45 to 50 miles per hour
in heavy rain," the defendant moved to dismiss on double jeop-
ardy grounds.8 4 This motion was denied."
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's deci-
sion, 6 and the Supreme Court affirmed. 7 In a five-to-four deci-
sion, the Court adopted the suggestion in Vitale and created a
broad "same-conduct" test: "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars
any subsequent prosecution [if,] to establish an essential element
of an offense charged in that prosecution, [the government] will
prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant
has already been prosecuted.""8
The Court noted that the narrower "same-elements" test of
Blockburger "was developed 'in the context of multiple punish-
ments imposed in a single prosecution"'8 9 and was a "'rule of
statutory construction,' a guide to determining whether the legis-
lature intended multiple punishments."9 ' Quoting its decision in
Green v. United States,9 the Court explained that successive
prosecutions raise additional finality concerns that require a
broader protection. 92
"The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the An-
glo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated at-
tempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby sub-
84. Id. at 514.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 515..
88. Id. at 521.
89. Id. at 516 (quoting Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778 (1985)).
90. Id. at 517 (quoting in part Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983)). The ma-
jority disagreed with Justice Scalia's contention in dissent that "we have applied the
[Blockburger] formulation in virtually every case defining the 'same offense' decided since
Blockburger." Id. at 517 n.8 (citing id. at 535-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The Court noted
that every one of the eight cases cited by Justice Scalia determined the permissibility of
cumulative punishment and not the permissibility of successive prosecution. See id. at 517
n.8. According to.the majority, "[n]one of the cases even suggests that Blockburger is the
exclusive definition of 'same offence' in the context of successive prosecutions." Id.
91. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
92. Grady, 495 U.S. at 518.
[Vol. 37:471
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jecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity...."
In adopting a "same-conduct" test, the Court recognized that
successive prosecutions give the state an "opportunity to rehearse
its presentation of proof, thus increasing the risk of an erroneous
conviction for one or more of the offenses charged."94 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that "[elven when a State can bring multiple
charges against an individual under Blockburger, a tremendous
additional burden is placed on that defendant if he must face
each of the charges in a separate proceeding.
9 5
C. The "Same-Elements" Test Redux
Three terms after Grady in United States v. Dixon,96 the Su-
preme Court overruled Grady in another five-to-four decision and
returned to Blockburger's "same-elements" test as the sole defini-
tion of "same offence."97
In Dixon, two defendants, Dixon and Foster, were tried for
criminal contempt based on orders prohibiting them from engag-
93. Id. (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 187).
94. Id. at 518. In support of this connection, the Court cited Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S.
31 (1982), which states that the Double Jeopardy Clause "'prevents the State from honing
its trial strategies and perfecting its evidence through successive attempts at conviction."'
Grady, 495 U.S. at 518 (citing Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 41). The Court also cited Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), which notes the State's concession that after the defen-
dant's acquittal the prosecution did "what every good attorney would do-he refined his
presentation in light of the turn of events at the first trial." Grady, 495 U.S. at 518 (citing
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 447). The Court included Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) for
support as well. Grady, 495 U.S. at 518-19. In Hoag, after an acquittal, the State called
only the witness who had testified most favorably at the first trial and the defendant was
convicted. Grady, 495 U.S. at 518-19 (citing Hoag, 356 U.S. at 471-72).
95. Id. at 519. Not surprisingly, the Court in Grady analyzed its own precedent and
determined that it had not relied exclusively on the Blockburger test in the context of mul-
tiple prosecutions since 1889. See id. at 519-20. The Court interpreted its precedents in-
stead as creating a direct path to the conclusion that "a technical comparison of the ele-
ments of the two offenses as required by Blockburger does not protect defendants
sufficiently from the burdens of multiple trials." Id. at 520.
96. 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
97. Later, in Dixon, the Court interpreted the same precedents from Grady as indicat-
ing that it had consistently relied upon Blockburger as the only test. See id. at 703-04. It
is noteworthy that between Grady and Dixon, the membership of the Court changed. Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall left the Court and Justices Souter and Thomas joined it. In
Dixon, the Grady dissenters became the majority and the Grady majority became the dis-
senters. Significant as well, the parties did not raise the issue of overruling Grady with
the Court in Dixon. Thus, this break with Grady occurred sua sponte. See id.
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ing in criminal conduct-the same conduct for which they were
later prosecuted.9" The trial court released Dixon on bail in an or-
der that required him not to commit "any criminal offense."99
Thereafter, he was arrested and charged with possession of co-
caine with intent to distribute and held in contempt. 00 His later
motion to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds was
granted, and this ruling was upheld by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals.'
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the possession
charges against Dixon, reasoning that the release order incorpo-
rated the entire criminal code. 102 Thus, possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute became a lesser included offense of the con-
tempt charge, and the prosecution was therefore barred.0 3
Foster was the subject of a civil protection order that arose out
of attacks on his estranged wife.' °4 The order provided that he not
"molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or physically abuse"
her.10 5 He was acquitted of some counts and convicted of others.
10 6
When he was later indicted for the same course of conduct, he
moved to dismiss the charges on double jeopardy grounds.0 7 The
motion was denied."0 8 The court of appeals reversed and held that
the prosecution was barred.0 9
The Court upheld the dismissal of the assault charge against
Foster because it was incorporated in the Court's order providing
inter alia that he not "assault" his wife."0 However, the other four
counts-assault with intent to kill and threats to injure or kid-
nap--were not barred because they required proof of a specific in-
98. Id. at 691.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 691-92.
101. Id. at 691-94.
102. Id. at 698-700.
103. See id. Moreover, because contempt requires both knowledge of the order and the
commission of any crime, and because possession is a crime, each offense did not contain
an element the other did not. See id. at 700. Therefore, under Blockburger they were the
same offense. See id.
104. Id. at 692.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 693.
107. Id.
108. Id.




tent that the contempt charge (based on simple assault and
threatening "in any manner") did not.111 The prosecution would
have been barred under Grady, because the government would
have relied on the same assault and threats to establish the con-
tempt charge at the later proceeding.1 2 The Court overruled
Grady, however, holding that it was "wholly inconsistent with
earlier Supreme Court precedent and with the clear common-law
understanding of double jeopardy," lacked "constitutional roots,"
and was too difficult to apply."' In this case, Justice Scalia, a
Grady dissenter, wrote the majority opinion.1 14
111. Id. at 700, 702-03. It is important to realize the effect of this holding. For Dixon,
the charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell (which carries a possible fifteen-
year sentence) was found to be a lesser included offense of the charge of contempt (which
carries a six-month sentence). Id. at 700. This is not consistent with any definition of
lesser included offense. Moreover, the effect is that the conviction for contempt barred any
future prosecution for the drug offense. See id. The situation was not as problematic for
Foster because, although a prosecution for simple assault was barred, he could still be
prosecuted for assault with intent to injure. See id. As to both, however, the fact that one
crime was intended to vindicate the power of the court and the other was designed to pro-
tect the public has no place in the "same-elements" test. See id. at 699-700.
112. See id. at 703-04.
113. Id. at 704. According to Justice Scalia, the adoption of the Grady "same-conduct"
standard required the creation of several large exceptions, one of which concerned whether
conspiracy and the crime that is the object of the conspiracy are the "same offence" for
double jeopardy purposes. Id. Indeed, there is long-standing Supreme Court authority that
"the agreement to do the act is distinct from the act itself." United States v. Bayer, 331
U.S. 532, 542 (1947). Likewise, conspiracy has "ingredients as well as implications, dis-
tinct from the completion of the unlawful project," such that the "commission of the sub-
stantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses." Pinker-
ton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643-44 (1946); accord, Garrett v. United States, 471
U.S. 773, 778 (1985); lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-79 (1975). In United
States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992), the Court relied upon the Bayer-Pinkerton precedent
and held that a defendant could be successively prosecuted for conspiracy and for a sub-
stantive crime that was one of the overt acts alleged to have occurred in furtherance of
that conspiracy. Id. at 389-90. The Felix court reasoned that the lesser included offense
exception to "same offence" applies only to a "single course of conduct" and not to the "mul-
tilayered conduct" involved in conspiracies and overt acts. Id. at 390.
114. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 688. Justice Scalia's reliance upon Blockburger and Nielsen
to establish the historical pedigree of the "same-elements" test has been described as
"awkward." See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy After
Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1995); see also supra notes 58-61 and accompany-
ing text. In Nielsen, the court stated that "where... a person has been tried and convicted
for a crime which has various incidents included in it, he cannot be a second time tried for
one of those incidents without being twice put in jeopardy for the same offence." Nielsen,
131 U.S. at 188.
Interestingly, as the Court noted later in the Brown v. Ohio decision, "strict application
of the Blockburger test [in Nielson] would have permitted imposition of consecutive sen-
tences had the charges been consolidated in a single proceeding." 432 U.S. 161, 166 n.6.
(1977). That is, unlawful cohabitation contains an element (living with more than one
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Justice Scalia's opinion in Dixon relied largely upon his dissent
in Grady, in which he had made two textual arguments.115 First,
he had defined "offense" as "transgression" or "the [vliolation or
[blreaking of a [1]aw" and had concluded that the statutory defini-
tions of the crimes were the appropriate basis of comparison. 16
Second, Justice Scalia explained that because the clause protects
individuals against being "twice put in jeopardy," it presupposes
that "sameness" can be determined before jeopardy attaches, i.e.,
before the second trial. 7 Because that was always true under the
Blockburger test, but was not always true under the Grady test,
the Grady test was not the proper vehicle by which to determine
double jeopardy."'
In Grady, Justice Scalia had also relied on the historical and
practical record of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict to sup-
port his arguments in dissent."9 In England and the colonies,
these common law pleas prohibited a second prosecution only if
the offenses charged were the same in fact and law. 120 These
principles, according to Justice Scalia, could be equated with the
"same-elements" test in Blockburger."2' In addition, Justice Scalia
agreed with the basis for Justice O'Connor's dissent in Grady, in
which she argued that the Court's prior opinion in Dowling v.
United States'22 foreclosed the majority's conclusions. 2
woman) that adultery does not and adultery contains an element (marriage) that unlawful
cohabitation does not. See id. Nevertheless, the Nielsen court held they were the same of-
fense by concluding that the cohabitation statute required evidence of marriage and sex-
ual intercourse such that adultery became a lesser included offense of unlawful cohabita-
tion. See id.; see also In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889).
Justice Souter contended in his Dixon dissent that this parsing of the statutory lan-
guage represented a focus on the conduct with which the defendant was being charged and
provided no support for Justice Scalia's reliance on the "same-elements" test. See Dixon,
509 U.S. at 749-53, 761-63 (Souter, J., dissenting). Whichever view is correct, it does ap-
pear that the focus of the Nielsen Court was not on a technical reading of the "same-
elements" test, but rather on the fairness of successive prosecutions in this context.
115. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704; see also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 528-29 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. Grady, 495 U.S. at 529 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704; Grady, 495 U.S. at 529-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 530 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 530-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980);
Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977); In re Niel-
son, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
121. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 535-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
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In addition to his textual arguments, Justice Scalia distin-
guished Nielsen, Brown, Harris, and Vitale.'24 Justice Scalia in-
terpreted Nielsen's use of the term "incidents" to refer to "ele-
ments," as opposed to conduct, 125 and discounted as dicta the
language from Brown and Harris stating that there was a test
beyond the "same-elements" test.126 He claimed that the Vitale
Court had simply deferred the question of whether a double jeop-
ardy claim based on proof of the same conduct at the second trial
could later succeed, and that the answer to that question should
now be "no.'" 1
27
Justice Scalia also rejected the Vitale Court's reliance on
Brown, describing the Brown decision as "nothing more than a
straightforward application of Blockburger."1 2' He rejected Vi-
tale's reliance on Harris, noting that the Harris decision was
based on the proposition that "'conviction of a greater crime,
murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime,
robbery with firearms."'129 In Dixon, Justice Scalia chose to rely
on Gavieres v. United States" ° and Burton v. United States,"'
123. See Grady, 495 U.S. 524-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 538-39
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In Dowling, a prosecution for bank robbery, evidence that the de-
fendant had committed a prior, similar robbery was admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
Dowling, 493 U.S. at 345. This evidence was admitted on the question of identity and to
tie the defendant to the person who had allegedly lent him the getaway car in the second
robbery. Id. The individual was co-defendant in the first robbery trial, which resulted in
an acquittal. Id. at 345-46. The Dowling Court held that the evidence was not barred by
the Double Jeopardy Clause because it did not determine an issue of ultimate fact in the
second trial, and because the government was not required to prove the defendant's iden-
tity as the first robber beyond a reasonable doubt at the second trial. See id. at 347-48.
Grady only prohibited such proof if it was necessary to prove an essential element of the
second charge. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 521-22.
124. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 705-07.
125. Id. at 705 n.10.
126. Id. at 706. See supra notes 53, 69 and accompanying text.
127. Grady, 495 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 706.
129. Id. at 538 (quoting Harris, 433 U.S. at 682). Of course, that is not entirely true;
conviction of felony murder can be based on proof of other felonies and does not require
proof of armed robbery. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(b) (1962).
130. 220 U.S. 338 (1911). In Gavieres, the defendant had been convicted of being drunk
in a public place in violation of a city ordinance in Manila. Id. at 341. He was then con-
victed based on the same incident, of threatening or insulting a public official in violation
of a provision of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands. Id. The Court held that his dou-
ble jeopardy rights had not been denied because the two charges were different, even
though they involved the same conduct. Id. at 345.
131. 202 U.S. 344 (1906). In Burton, the defendant, a U.S. Senator, had been convicted
of taking money from a corporation, but acquitted of taking money from an individual who
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both pre-Blockburger cases, to conclude that "the Blockburger test
(and only the Blockburger test)" defined "same offence" for double
jeopardy purposes.132 Finally, responding to Justice Souter's con-
tention that reliance solely, on Blockburger violates underlying
double jeopardy principles, Justice Scalia suggested that prosecu-
tors "have little to gain and much to lose" from bringing separate
prosecutions to perfect their cases.'33
Concurring and dissenting in Dixon, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, pointed out that most
courts had held that double jeopardy did not prevent conviction
for contempt and for the underlying substantive offense, 3 4 and
that this view "dates back to the English common law."'35 Chief
Justice Rehnquist thus rejected the notion that the substantive
criminal offenses at issue in Dixon were lesser included offenses
of the crime of contempt.
136
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice White, joined
by Justice Stevens, concluded that the subsequent prosecutions
were barred because "the offense at issue in the contempt pro-
ceedings were either identical to, or lesser included offenses of,
those charged in the subsequent prosecutions."3 7 Justice White
criticized 'the majority for ignoring the principles underlying the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the "central purpose [of which was] to
was an officer of that corporation. Id. at 360-65. When the convictions were reversed, the
prosecutor brought a new indictment alleging receipt of funds from the corporation. Id.
The defendant's argument that his prior acquittal barred the second prosecution was re-
jected. Id. Plainly, the charges were the same in law, but were not the same in fact. Accord-
ingly, the Court stated, "jeopardy is not the same when the two indictments are so diverse
as to preclude the same evidence from sustaining both." Id. at 381 (citations omitted).
132. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 707-08. Neither Gavieres nor Burton refer to the Blockburger
test; both simply reject double jeopardy claims that arise out of the same criminal transac-
tion. See Gavieres, 220 U.S. at 338; Burton, 202 U.S. at 344. Justice Scalia also asserted
that Grady had "already prove[n] unstable in application." Dixon, 509 U.S. at 709. He
pointed to United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992), where the Court held that "a subse-
quent prosecution for conspiracy to manufacture, possess and distribute methampheta-
mine" was permissible after "a previous conviction for attempt to manufacture the same.
substance." Id. According to Justice Scalia, Felix required the Court to create a major ex-
ception to Grady. Id. at 709-10. He referred as well to lower court decisions expressing
confusion about Grady and to two commentators who had concluded that Grady had "con-
tributed confusion." Id. at 711, 712 n.16.
133. Id. at 710 n.15.
134. Id. at 714-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. Id. at 715 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
136. Id. at 714 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. Id. at 731 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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protect against vexatious multiple prosecutions."3 ' Like Justice
Blackmun, Justice White dissented from the decision overruling
Grady.139 Justice White argued that it was "injudicious" to over-
rule Grady when that issue had not been raised or considered by
the court of appeals or in the petition for certiorari. 4 °
Justice Blackmun, also concurring and dissenting in part, ar-
gued that the prosecutions were not barred, because contempt
and the substantive criminal law serve different interests: con-
tempt punishes disobedience to a court order,. while the criminal
law punishes for an act against the community.".' Justice Black-
mun expressed concern that the majority's holding would handi-
cap trial court's efforts to protect their own authority.'42 He also
dissented from the judgment overruling Grady, and criticized the
majority for "so cavalierly [overruling] a precedent that [was]
barely three years old and that [had] proved neither unworkable
nor unsound."
14 3
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in the
judgment in part and dissented in part.' Like Justices Black-
mun and White, Justice Souter believed the majority had "read
our precedents so narrowly as to leave them bereft of the princi-
ples animating [the double jeopardy] protection." 4 ' Justice Souter
argued that Grady "amount[ed] merely to an expression of just
those animating principles" 46 and should not have been over-
ruled. 4 7 Moreover, according to Justice Souter, the "same-
elements" test is merely a method of statutory construction and is
not the only test for preventing successive prosecutions. 4 ' The
138. Id. at 735 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
139. Id. at 740 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id. (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
141. Id. at 742 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
142. Id. at 742-43 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
143. Id. at 741 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
144. Id. at 743 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
145. Id. at 744 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
147. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Souter also joined in Part I of Justice White's opinion, and would have held, as did Justice
White, that the prosecution of Dixon and of Foster were barred in the entirety. Id. (Souter,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
148. Id. at 745 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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Double Jeopardy Clause requires that the government also meet
the "same-conduct" test established in Grady. 149
In addition to the Court's division concerning the return to the
"same-elements" test, the Court was sharply divided about how to
apply it. Justices Scalia and Kennedy would have applied the test
to the terms of the court's order and not to the statutory defini-
tion of the crime of contempt.150 Under the statutory definition,
each offense would have an element the other does not, and, thus,
would not be the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.151
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Tho-
mas, would have applied the test to the statutory elements of con-
tempt, which would have permitted successive prosecutions. 52
Finally, Justices White, Stevens, and Souter would have disre-
garded the court's contempt orders and the statutory definition of
contempt and compared the substantive offenses alleged in both
prosecutions. 53
III. UNITED KINGDOM
Protection against successive prosecution under United King-
dom law is afforded in two different ways: first, there is a core
"6same-elements" protection that is based on the pleas of autrefois
acquit and autrefois convict; second, this narrow protection is
supplemented by a broad judicial discretion to stay successive
prosecutions under the doctrine of "abuse of process." 4
149. Id. at 745-50 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
150. Id. at 697.
151. Id. These Justices, relying on Harris, likened contempt to felony murder, where
various felonies are incorporated into the felony murder statute and are thus a kind of
lesser included offense. Id. at 698.
152. Id. at 714-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Id. at 734 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
154. In England, a recent Law Commission Consultation Paper has recommended (1)
an exception to the rule against retrial after an acquittal to permit retrial where signifi-
cant new evidence of guilt emerges after the acquittal; and (2) broadening of the rule per-
mitting retrial after a tainted acquittal. THE LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No.
156: DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5.17, 6.2 (1999). For a thorough discussion of the government's
proposals see Ian Dennis, Rethinking Double Jeopardy: Justice and Finality in Criminal
Process, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 933. The Law Commission has also recommended enlarging
the circumstances upon which the prosecution may appeal from an acquittal. THE LAW
COMMISSION No. 267, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND PROSECUTION APPEALS, 1.19 (Lord High
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A. Autrefois Convict and Autrefois Acquit
As in the United States, in the United Kingdom the common
law pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit, the same pleas
that the U.S. Supreme Court held to be synonymous with the
Blockburger test, 5 bar retrial only of offenses that are the same
in fact and in law.'56
Application of the pleas focuses on the statutory definition of
the crimes and bars successive prosecution after acquittal or con-
viction for (1) the same statutory offense; and (2) any offense of
which the defendant could have been convicted, i.e., one for which
he necessarily was "in peril" at the first trial. 57 It thus would bar
prosecution of a lesser included offense following conviction for a
more serious charge, 58 but it would not bar prosecution of a
Chancellor 2001). These recommendations were largely in response to an acquittal in the
Stephen Lawrence case, a racially-motivated homicide case that was widely condemned.
Id. 1.5.
For additional sources on the English protection against successive prosecution see
ANDREW L.-T. CHOO, ABUSE OF PROCESS AND JUDICIAL STAYS OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
(Clarendon Press 1993); MARTIN. L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969); ROSEMARY
PATTENDEN, ENGLISH CRIMINAL APPEALS 1844-1994 (Clarendon Press 1996); ROSEMARY
PATTENDEN, JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND CRIMINAL LITIGATION (Clarendon Press 1990).
155. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993).
156. Connelly v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1964] A.C. 1254, 1358 (1963)
157. Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58 § 6(3) (Eng.) defines the concept of "in peril" as fol-
lows:
Where, on a person's trial on indictment for any offence except treason or
murder, the jury find him not guilty of the offence specifically charged in the
indictment, but the allegations in the indictment amount to or include (ex-
pressly or by implication) an allegation of another offence falling within the
jurisdiction of the court of trial, the jury may find him guilty of that other of-
fence or of an offence of which he could be found guilty on an indictment spe-
cifically charging that other offence.
Id. It is difficult to determine whether a charge is necessarily included in a prior charge.
The rule would not bar a second prosecution for assault after a conviction for robbery, be-
cause robbery can be committed in England through blackmail and other non-assaultive
conduct. However, it would bar a prosecution for larceny after a conviction for robbery, be-
cause theft is necessarily included in robbery. Similarly, it would not bar a prosecution for
burglary with intent to commit theft after a prosecution for burglary and theft, because
burglary with intent is not necessarily included in burglary and theft (the defendant need
not have had a requisite intent at the time of entering the premises). Thus, like the Block-
burger test, this test can be circumvented by a prosecutor choosing to allege only part of
the criminal event in the first indictment or by carefully selecting the charges to bring
based on a single criminal incident. This affords a defendant a very narrow protection.
158. The common law pleas would not bar retrial of a greater offense after a lesser in-
cluded offense, because the defendant could not have been in peril of the greater offense at
trial. To prevent this, the English courts have developed the rule that "whether a party
accused of a minor offence is acquitted or convicted, he shall not be charged again on the
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greater offense where a defendant is convicted of a nonfatal
charge and the victim subsequently dies. 159 Some courts have
barred prosecution for an offense that is substantially the same
as a prior offense. 6 ' This is an inexact, sui generis test that pro-
vides little guidance for future cases.
B. Abuse of Process-Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions
The English House of Lords has recognized that the common
law pleas are too narrow to provide sufficient protection against
successive prosecution. Rather than use the approach taken by
the U.S. Supreme Court and broaden the construction of these
pleas, the House of Lords has recognized a broad judicial discre-
tion to prevent successive prosecution that is deemed to consti-
tute an abuse of process.' 6'
As noted above, the common law pleas bar reprosecution for
crimes that are the same in law and fact or any lesser included
offenses. In Connelly, the House of Lords analyzed the courts'
power to bar successive prosecution for crimes that are not the
same in law but that arise out of the same facts.'62
In Connelly, the defendant and others were charged in two in-
dictments with murder and robbery with aggravation, arising out
of an office robbery in which an employee was killed.'63 According
to English practice, which is intended to protect the accused, the
same facts in a more aggravated form." R. v. Elrington, [1861] 1 B. & S. 688, 696. But see
R. v. Barron, [19141 2 K.B. 570 (Eng. C.A.), where a defendant acquitted of sodomy was
convicted of gross indecency with another male. Id. at 570. The graver charge of sodomy
involved gross indecency and other elements, and thus acquittal of sodomy did not involve
acquittal of every part of it. Id. at 576.
159. R. v. Thomas, [1950] 1 KB. 26, 29 (Eng. C.A. 1949).
160. See, e.g., Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Humphrys, [1977] A.C. 1 (1976).
161. Id. Since Connelly, an abuse of process has been defined as "something so unfair
and wrong that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is in all other
respects a regular proceeding." Hui Chi-Ming v. R., [1992] 1 A.C. 34, 57 (P.C. 1991) (ap-
peal taken from Hong Kong). It may be an abuse of process if "the prosecution have ma-
nipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection
provided by the law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality," R. v. Derby Crown
Court ex parte Brooks, 148 J.P. 609 (1984), or if the defendant will be prejudiced by delay.
Abuse of process is not limited to cases in which the defendant cannot obtain a fair trial,
but applies also where it would be unfair to try the defendant.
162. Connelly [1964] A.C. at 1295.
163. Id. at 1257.
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murder charge was tried alone.'64 The defense presented an alibi
and also argued that if the defendant had been present, he had no
intent to murder; however, the defendant was convicted.'65
Thereafter, the judge directed that the indictment for robbery be
stayed.'66 Connelly appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeal
held that the judge's instruction on the question of whether or not
he had been present was in error.'67 As required by English law,
the court of appeal entered a judgment of acquittal. 6 ' However,
the court also granted leave for the prosecution to proceed on the
robbery indictment.'69
When the robbery indictment came before the court, the defen-
dant entered a plea of autrefois acquit.7 ° In accordance with Eng-
lish practice, that plea was presented to the jury and rejected.' 7'
The judge was then asked to exercise his discretion to bar the
reprosecution as abuse of process, but he held that he had no such
discretion. 7 ' He expressed the opinion that it would be wrong for
the Crown to prosecute, but the Crown proceeded nonetheless,
and the defendant was convicted.' In the House of Lords, Lord
Devlin wrote the majority opinion.174 He held that the doctrines of
autrefois acquit and autrefois convict are narrow and only prevent
successive prosecution for offenses that are the same in fact and




167. Id. at 1257-58.
168. Id. at 1259.
169. See id. at 1338.




174. Reflecting a Dixon-like split of opinion, the decision of the five Lords contains four
opinions. See id. at 1254-1368. Thereafter, the English courts misunderstood Connelly
and for many years interpreted Lord Morris's opinion as the majority opinion, which
would have held that the common law pleas were the only bar to successive prosecution on
the same facts. See, e.g., R. v. Moxon-Tritsch, [1988] Crim. L.R. 46, 47 (holding that "Lord
Morris's principles set out in Connelly v. D.P.P. correctly represented the law"). Indeed, a
leading commentator had reached the same erroneous conclusion. See ARCHBOLD'S
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, PLEADING & PRACTICE, 4-117 (1997), discussed in R. v. Beedie,
[1998] Q.B. 356, 361 (Eng. C.A. 1997).
175. Connelly [1964] A.C. at 1339-40.
The word "offence" embraces both the facts which constitute the crime and
the legal characteristics which make it an offence. For the doctrine to apply it
must be the same offence both in fact and in law. Robbery is not in law the
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Dixon.176 In addition, however, Lord Devlin recognized an inher-
ent judicial power to prevent abuse of process through reprosecu-
tion stating:
[T]he judges of the High Court have in their inherent jurisdiction,
both in civil and in criminal matters, power (subject of course to any
statutory rules) to make and enforce rules of practice in order to en-
sure that the court's process is used fairly and conveniently by both
sides. I consider it to be within this power for the court to declare
that the prosecution must as a general rule join in the same indict-
ment charges that "are founded on the same facts, or form or are a
part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character" (I
quote from the Indictments Act, 1915, Schedule I, rule 3 ... ); and
power to enforce such a direction ... by staying a second indictment
if it is satisfied that its subject-matter ought to have been included in
the first.
177
Accordingly, the Lords adopted the following rule:
[A] judge should stay an indictment ... when he is satisfied that the
charges therein are founded on the same facts as the charges in a
previous indictment on which the accused has been tried, or form or
are a part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character as
the offences charged in the previous indictment. He will do this be-
cause as a general rule it is oppressive to an accused for the prosecu-
tion not to use rule 3 [England's joinder statute] where it can prop-
erly be used. But a second trial on the same or similar facts is not
always and necessarily oppressive, and there may in a particular
case be special circumstances which make it just and convenient in
that case. The judge must then, in all the circumstances of the par-
ticular case, exercise his discretion as to whether or not he applies
the general rule.
1 78
In Connelly, of course, the prosecution had followed an estab-
lished practice of trying murder charges separately from any
other charges-the House of Lords disapproved of that practice
and held that it should be discontinued. 179 But since the prosecu-
same offence as murder (or as manslaughter, of which the accused could also
have been convicted on the first indictment) and so the doctrine does not ap-
ply in the present case.
Id.
176. 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
177. Connelly [19641 A.C. at 1347.
178. Id. at 1359-60. The House of Lords gave as examples of general circumstances
cases in which a judge would have severed charges if they had been joined and where the
accused has obtained an order of severance. Id. at 1360.
179. Id. at 1360-61.
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tion had relied upon a well-established practice, there was no
abuse of process.8 °
In so holding, Lord Devlin made clear that the judicial discre-
tion to bar reprosecution is founded on a general power "to pre-
vent unfairness to the accused ... [particularly with reference to
the framing of indictments.""' Also, in language similar to that of
the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Green,' Lord Devlin
noted, "if the power of the prosecutor to spread his case over any
number of indictments was unrestrained there could be grave in-
justice to defendants."'8 3 Lord DevlIin also relied upon "the courts'
duty to conduct their proceedings so as to command the respect
and confidence of the public,""8 4 in language quite similar to that
used by the U.S. courts in describing their inherent power.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1347. The House of Lords cited the requirements of disclosure of exculpatory
evidence as another example of this discretion. Id. at 1361. This is the English equivalent
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which was based on due process principles.
182. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). In Green, the Supreme Court stated:
The underlying idea.., is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for
an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecu-
rity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may
be found guilty.
Id. at 187-88.
183. Connelly [1964] A.C. at 1347. Lord Devlin stated that "even the simplest set of
facts almost invariably gives rise to more than one offence...." Id. at 1353. He continued,
stating that:
[I]f the Crown were to be allowed to prosecute as many times as it wanted to
do on the same facts, so long as for each prosecution it could find a different
offence in law, there would be a grave danger of abuse and of injustice to de-
fendants. The Crown might, for example, begin with a minor accusation so as
to have a trial run and test the strength of the defence... [or] the Crown
might keep a count up its sleeve. Or a private prosecutor might seek to har-
ass a defendant by multiplicity of process in the different courts.
Id.
184. Id. The House of Lords stated:
Suppose that in the present case the appellant had first been acquitted of
robbery and then convicted of murder. Inevitably doubts Would be felt about
the soundness of the conviction. That is why every system of justice is bound
to insist upon the finality of the judgment arrived at by a due process of law.
It is quite inconsistent with that principle that the Crown should be entitled
to re-open again and again what is in effect the same matter.
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Lord Devlin rejected the suggestion that, instead of recognizing
a broad abuse of process protection, the Lords should expand the
scope of the common law pleas.185 He stated:
If I had felt that the doctrine of autrefois was the only form of relief
available to an accused who has been prosecuted on substantially the
same facts, I should be tempted to stretch the doctrine as far as it
would go. But, as that is not my view, I am inclined to favour keep-
ing it within limits that are precise.
18 6
Finally, in contrast to Justice Scalia's sentiment in Dixon that
there was little danger of prosecutorial rehearsing because there
was little incentive to do so,1 8 7 Lord Devlin rejected the contention
that the Crown could be trusted to use its resources fairly by the
sheer press of business, stating that:
The fact that the Crown has.., generally behaved with great
propriety in the conduct of prosecutions, has up till now avoided the
need for any consideration of this point. Now that it emerges, it is
seen to be one of great constitutional importance. Are the courts to
rely on the Executive to protect their process from abuse? Have they
not themselves an inescapable duty to secure fair treatment for those
who come or are brought before them? To questions of this sort there
is only one possible answer. The courts cannot contemplate for a
moment the transference to the Executive of the responsibility for
seeing that the process of law is not abused.
1 8 8
In a separate opinion, Lord Pearce agreed that there was an
inherent power to prevent vexatious successive prosecution and
that there was "no reason" why the pleas of autrefois should ex-
haust the inherent power of the courts.189 He traced English
precedent upholding the courts' powers to prevent successive
prosecutions upon the same facts in order to avoid "abuse and in-
justice." 9 ° Lord Pearce also noted that "[i]nstead of attempting to
185. See id. at 1340.
186. Id. It could be said, of course, that the failure to recognize any supplemental pro-
tection against successive prosecution beyond the common law pleas has forced the United
States Supreme Court to wrestle with the scope of the pleas, pushing and prodding them
and yielding inconsistent and sometimes unprincipled and illogical results.
187. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 710 n.15 (1993).
188. Connelly [1964] A.C. at 1354.
189. Id. at 1361-62.
190. Id.; see, e.g., Wemyss v. Hopkins, [1875] L.R.-Q.B. 378. In Wemyss, the defendant
was tried for and convicted of driving a carriage so that he struck a horse causing "hurt
and damage" and was later convicted of unlawfully assaulting, striking, and otherwise
abusing the same injured party. Id. at 378-79. The second conviction was quashed, not on
the basis of autrefois convict, but because one could not be convicted twice for the same
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enlarge the pleas beyond their proper scope, it is better that the
courts should apply to such cases an avowed judicial discretion
based on the broader principles which underlie the pleas." 9'
In contrast to Lords Reid, Devlin, and Pearce, Lord Morris of
Borth-y-Gest, joined by Lord Hodson, would have limited the pro-
tection against successive prosecution to the narrow common law
pleas.92 These Lords found no additional judicial power to order
an indictment to be stayed on the ground of abuse of process.
19 3
Connelly was misinterpreted for many years.'94 Thirty-three
years after the decision, in Regina v. Beedie,'95 the Court of Ap-
peal clarified Connelly.'96 In Beedie, a young female tenant died of
carbon monoxide poisoning due to her landlord's failure to main-
tain a gas heater.'97 The landlord was prosecuted by the Health
and Safety Executive. 9 ' The landlord pled guilty, was granted a
conditional discharge, and was ordered to pay costs.'99 He was
then charged by the Crown Prosecution Service with manslaugh-
ter based on the same facts.200
The court ultimately quashed the conviction.2 ' The court based
its decision on Connelly and held that the prosecution was not
barred by the plea of autrefois convict because the charges were
different in law.20 2 However, because Connelly established a pre-
sumption against the retrial of different charges on the same
facts absent special circumstances, and because the court found
no such special circumstances existed, it quashed the convic-
matter. Id. at 380-81. See also R. v. Miles, [18901 24 Q.B.D. 423 (finding that a person
convicted of an assault and discharged on promise of good behavior cannot be convicted a
second time for the same assault); R. v. King, [18971 1 Q.B. 214 (1896) (holding that a per-
son convicted for obtaining goods under false pretenses cannot afterwards be convicted for
larceny of the same goods).
191. Connelly [1964] A.C. at 1364.
192. Id. at 1305-06. On this analysis, the crimes of robbery with aggravation and mur-
der are two distinct crimes since there could be robbery without killing and killing without
robbery.
193. Id. at 1305.
194. See supra note 173.
195. [1998] Q.B. 356 (Eng. C.A. 1997).
196. Id. at 358.
197. Id. at 359.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 360.
201. Id. at 367.
202. Id. at 360-61.
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tion.20 3 The fact that two different prosecutorial authorities were
involved was found not to be a special circumstance allowing for
retrial. °4
There is very little authority on what would constitute "special
circumstances" sufficient to rebut the strong presumption against
successive prosecution. The three examples cited in Connelly
were: (1) acquiescence by the defendant in separate trials of two
indictments; (2) instances in which a further event occurs after
the first trial (e.g., the death of a victim of an assault for which
the defendant has previously been convicted would allow for a
subsequent homicide prosecution);0 5 and (3) cases in which new
evidence of guilt of a different offense based on the same facts is
discovered after the first trial.0 6 As noted above, in Beedie, the
203. Id. at 366. In fact, the court held that the lower court had erred in employing a
"balancing test" between the public interest in establishing liability for this death and the
defendant's interests, rather than looking for "special circumstances" to justify a second
prosecution. Id.
204. Id.
The Health and Safety Executive were well aware of the risk of double jeop-
ardy, and a conscious decision was made about the nature of the charges to
be pursued in the light of this principle. The only purpose to be achieved by a
manslaughter prosecution was the imposition of a further penalty and the
heaping of condemnation on the defendant.
Id. at 364. The court went on to say:
,We see no reason why, prior to institution of the summary proceedings, the
Crown Protection Service should not have been alerted by the police, the
Health and Safety Executive or the local authority to the enquiry which was
being undertaken into the circumstances leading to the death of this unfor-
tunate young woman. Had this been done, it should have been sensible for a
possible joint decision to be reached as to what charges could, and should,
have been properly brought against the defendant, and no doubt manslaugh-
ter would have been among them.
Id. at 366. In addition, the court reaffirmed the principle established in R. v. Elrington,
that '"whether a party accused of a minor offence is acquitted or convicted, he shall not be
charged again on the same facts in a more aggravated form."' Id. at 362 (quoting R. v. El-
rington, [1861] 1 B. & S. 688, 696); see also R. v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions ex parte Stacey,
Q.B., CO/714/99 (1999) (finding that it was proper for the CPS to refuse to prosecute a cor-
poration for manslaughter after guilty pleas to charges brought by the Health and Safety
Executive and a heavy fine, since such a prosecution would have been an abuse of proc-
ess).
205. Connelly [1964] A.C. at 1305; see R. v. De Salvi (1867) 10 Cox. C.C. 481, 481; R. v.
Morris [18671 KB. 480, 480.
206. Connelly [1964]A.C. at 1306. This is broader than, but similar to, the exception
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Diaz, 223 U.S. 442
(1912). In Diaz, however, the Court's analysis concluded that the two prosecutions were
not for the same offense. Id. at 448.
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involvement of separate prosecutorial agencies did not constitute
special circumstances.0 7
C. Application
Several rules emerge from the case law that guide the abuse of
process discretion.
1. Lesser and Greater Offenses
First, as set forth above, crimes may not be prosecuted in as-
cending order of severity. The English courts have repeatedly ap-
plied this rule in the context of road fatalities like that in Grady
v. Corbin."' In Regina v. Cwmbran Justices, ex parte Pope,"9 af-
ter the defendant had been acquitted of driving with excess alco-
hol he was charged with driving without due care and atten-
tion.2"' The court held the proceedings should be stayed.211 In
207. Beedie [1998] Q.B. at 366. An example of special circumstances was presented in
In re Solicitor. Q.B. CO/2504/2000, 2000 WL 1791470 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. Nov. 20, 2000). How-
ever, the case appears to be sui generis. There, :a solicitor was suspended from practice
based on his failure to keep accountsand his personal use of client funds. Id. at *1. There-
after, he was charged and convicted of theft based on the same facts and sentenced to a
year of imprisonment. Id. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal then heard a second appli-
cation based not on the misconduct but on the existence of the theft conviction. Id. The tri-
bunal held that the second application was an abuse of process, but the appellate court
disagreed because of the "special circumstance" thatthe case involved the conduct of a so-
licitor. Id. at *1, *5-6. In addition, of course, the case falls squarely within the exception
that permits successive prosecution of two charges that each have different elements
and/or based on changed circumstances: the criminal conviction did not exist at the time
the first proceeding was brought and was a legitimate, separate basis for discipline. In any
event, the court directed the tribunal not to impose any additional punishment if the
charges at the second proceeding were sustained. Id. at *6.
208. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
209. [1979] 143 J.P.R. 638.
210. Id. at 640.
211. Id. The court explained that this holding was
not because that last charge gives rise to the same issue as that which was
canvassed before the jury at the Crown Court but because it would be a little,
at least, unfair to require him to stand his trial before the justices upon what
does involve the self-same issue, and because it would not be entirely in the
interests of public policy that one tribunal might be in a situation in which it
feels itself driven to a decision directly in conflict with what was the finding
of a jury, who after all form the basis of our. administration of common law
justice.
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Regina v. Forest of Dean Justices, ex parte Farley,212 the court
held that it was an abuse of process to pursue a charge of reckless
driving based on the allegation of excessive alcohol use after a
prosecution for driving with excess alcohol. 13 The court reached
the same result in Regina v. Moxon-Tritsch,"4 where a private
prosecution for causing death by reckless driving was stayed fol-
lowing a prosecution for careless driving and use of excess alco-
hol, explaining that:
The proposed prosecution arose from the same facts as those upon
which she had been convicted at the magistrates' court. It would be
oppressive to let her face a second trial for a more aggravated form of
the same offence to which she had already pleaded guilty .... The
learned judge said he could well understand the private prosecutors'
desire that the defendant should face the more serious charge before
a jury. But the learned judge considered that her ordeal must be
brought to an end.
215
2. Contempt
Second, it is not an abuse of process to prosecute contempt and
the underlying criminal conduct successively-the situation pre-
212. [1990] R.T.R. 228 (Q.B.).
213. Id. at 233.
214. [1988] Crim. L.R. 46, 47.
215. Id. Significantly, however, the court noted that if the defendant had pleaded guilty
only to the alcohol offense and not to driving without due care, the subsequent prosecution
could only be stayed as a matter of abuse of process and not under the plea of autrefois
convict because the issue of her driving had not been previously determined; i.e., she was
not in effect being charged with an aggravated form of the prior charges. See id. at 48,
cmt.
Because the English do not recognize the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Dir. of Pub.
Prosecutions v. Humphrys, [1977] A.C. 1 (1976), several courts have invoked the concept of
abuse of process to prevent reprosecution where all of the charges arise as part of the
same transaction for which the defendant has already been tried. For example, in R. v.
Roberts, [1979] Crim. L.R. 44, the defendant was charged with stealing an outboard motor
from his landlord. Id. at 44. A year earlier he had been charged with stealing hydraulic
jacks during the same time period. Id. His earlier defense was that the items had been
abandoned and he was acquitted. Id. at 45. The court stayed the second trial on the ground
that the matter was stale and that any conviction would be illogical and inconsistent. Id.
Similarly, in Dewhurst v. Foster & Foster, [1982] Crim. L.R. 582, the defendants were
charged with theft and their defense was that they had paid for the item in question. Id. at
582. The defendants were acquitted, but their employers brought a private prosecution




sented in Dixon.216 In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Twed-
dell,2"7 the defendant violated a court order and was held in con-
tempt based on his assault upon his wife.2"8 After the defendant
was sentenced to three months of imprisonment, a prosecution
was brought for the assault, and the defendant argued that it
constituted an abuse of process because it would be punishing
him twice for the same offense.2"9 The trial court agreed with the
defendant, but the appellate court reversed.22° Although both
charges were based on the same facts, the court relied upon the
different purposes of criminal prosecution: to protect public order,
rehabilitation, deterrence, and contempt-vindication of the
court's powers--to find no abuse in these successive prosecu-
tions.221 The court did note, however, that if the defendant were
found guilty, it would be appropriate to consider whether the sen-
tence previously imposed for contempt might be sufficient to
serve the public interest.222
3. Conspiracy
Finally, it is not an abuse of process to prosecute a defendant
successively for conspiracy and its object offense. In the combined
cases of Regina v. Payne and Regina v. Marshall,223 the Court of
Appeal (Criminal Division) held that it was permissible to pro-
ceed first on a conspiracy charge and, after an acquittal, to prose-
cute for the substantive crime underlying the conspiracy.224 In
Payne the defendants were charged with conspiracy to burgle and
twenty counts of burglary and handling stolen goods.225 The
prosecution proceeded on the conspiracy count only, and the court
acquitted the defendants.226 After the decision, the court granted
leave to proceed on the substantive counts before a new jury.227
216. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 691.
217. [2001] EWHC Admin 188 (Q.B. Div'1 Ct.) (LEXIS).
218. Id. at 11.
219. Id. at 1 1, 2.
220. Id. at 3, 24.
221. Id. at 14, 15, 16.
222. Id. at 19.
223. [1982] Crim. L.R. 684.
224. Id. at 685.
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The Court of Appeal held that the judge had been correct to grant
leave.228
IV. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Whether the Grady majority or the Dixon majority is correct,
the Supreme Court's analysis of its own precedent is wildly in-
consistent, more so than in any other area of its constitutional ju-
risprudence. As a result, the decision about the scope of the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause seems to be based not on text, history, or
legal precedent, but on the shifting membership of the Court.
As noted above, the English House of Lords has avoided this
problem by refusing to limit the protection against successive
prosecution to the limited scope of the common law pleas.229 In-
stead, it has interpreted those pleas narrowly and then recog-
nized a broad, discretionary abuse of process protection against
unfair reprosecution.23 °
A. A Narrow Double Jeopardy Protection
The U.S. Supreme Court should follow the analysis of the
House of Lords. Rather than massage the Double Jeopardy
Clause into a broader protection than it can logically or doctri-
nally sustain, the Court should, as it has done, define the double
jeopardy protection narrowly by the "same-elements" test.231
228. Id. at 685. On the other hand, in Regina v. Riebold, [1965] 1 All E.R. 653 (Bir-
mingham Assizes 1964), the defendant had been indicted for two counts of conspiracy and
twenty-seven overt acts which were used to establish one or the other of the conspiracy
counts. Id. at 654. The prosecution proceeded on the second count of conspiracy. Id. The
defendant was convicted, but the conviction was reversed and the indictment dismissed.
Id. An application for leave to proceed on the remaining counts was refused. Id. at 656.
The court held that "retrial... would become a complete reproduction of the [previous]
trial." Id. Even though "the prosecution [did] not desire to be oppressive," the court made
clear that it had to look to the effect of the prosecution's decision. Id. The court held that it
would be "bad and oppressive" to allow a retrial. Id.
229. See supra Part III.
230. See supra Part III.
231. One commentator has succinctly made the case for such a protection:
In many cases, the state may have no particularly good reason for splitting a
single criminal transaction or episode into two separate trials. And in some
cases, perhaps the state may have particularly bad-illegitimate-reasons.
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B. A Supplemental Due Process Protection
With that being said, what is to be made of the Supreme
Court's clear statement in Green v. United States2 32 of the fairness
interests imbedded in the double jeopardy protection that are not
protected by the "same-elements" test? The Court's articulation in
Green of the finality concerns of harassment, stress, expense, and
of the potential for wrongful conviction are not protected by the
"same-elements" test.233 Furthermore, what is to be made of the
explicit language of Brown v. Ohio,234 the apparent meaning of In
re Nielsen's "incidents" language,23 and the suggestion in Illinois
v. Vitale,236 in which the Court identified a protection beyond the
"same-elements" test in the successive prosecution context? While
the "same-elements" test may provide adequate protection
against multiple punishments-the context in which it was de-
cided-it provides minimal protection against the interests rec-
ognized by the Court in Green. To return to the example set forth
in the introduction, the "same-elements" test would permit suc-
cessive prosecution of armed robbery and bank robbery even
though they are based on the same conduct. In addition, it would
permit successive prosecution even where the defendant has been
acquitted of the first charge, thus providing no protection against
the prosecution's practicing, learning the defense, improving its
case, and convicting an innocent person. Moreover, it would per-
mit successive prosecution if the defendant had been convicted of
Perhaps bifurcation reflects a systematic attempt to vex or harass a defen-
dant, by wearing her down in successive proceedings, draining her financial
resources, and forcing her witnesses to appear twice on her behalf. Such
vexation can create a real risk that a defendant, though innocent of the
greater offense, will be erroneously convicted in the second trial. Or perhaps
the prosecutor is trying to evade statutory limits on prosecutorial discovery
by forcing a defendant to tip her hand in the first trial-a preliminary
round-so that the state, with the benefit of this 'cheat peek,' has an edge in
the second trial, the main event. Or perhaps the prosecutor is angry and vin-
dictive after the first trial because, although the state won a conviction, the
defendant largely prevailed in the sentencing, and the prosecutor seeks to
punish this success-and send a message to future defendants-via a new
round of charges.
Amar, supra note 27, at 1821-22 (footnotes omitted).
232. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
233. See id. at 187.
234. 432 U.S. 161, 166 n.6 (1977).
235. 131 U.S. 176, 187 (1889).
236. 447 U.S. 410, 420 (1980).
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the first crime, permitting the imposition of two full sentences for
one criminal act. As the Eleventh Circuit has pointed out, "[als
the test now stands, it is difficult to see many circumstances un-
der which the double jeopardy clause will place any check on a
prosecutor who displays a minimum degree of care in crafting in-
dictments."237
On the other hand, traditional, case-by-case due process analy-
sis fits quite well as a protection for these interests and would ra-
tionalize the U.S. Supreme Court's precedent under a consistent
theory. Prosecutorial motive,' fairness, and potential conviction of
the innocent are issues that have traditionally been subjected to a
case-by-case due process analysis. In fact, the Due Process Clause
has already been relied on to prevent an improperly motivated
second prosecution. In Blackledge v. Perry,23 the Court held that
the Due Process Clause prohibits the government from bringing
more serious charges on retrial after the defendant invokes his or
her right to a trial de novo." 9 The Court recognized a presump-
tion of vindictiveness in this context that could only be rebutted
by objective evidence showing the charges could not have been
brought before the defendant exercised his rights.24 ° As with all
presumptions, this presumption was based on the likelihood that
such a reprosecution was improperly motivated and was intended
to spare courts the "unseemly task" of probing the actual motives
of the prosecutor.24'
237. United States v. Sanchez, 3 F.3d 366, 367 (11th Cir. 1993).
238. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
239. Id. at 28-29.
240. Id. at 28-29 & n.7.
241. See id. at 28. In United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982), however, the Su-
preme Court refused to find a presumption of vindictiveness where misdemeanor charges
were replaced by felony charges after the defendant invoked his right to a jury trial, but
before any trial had taken place. Id. at 381-82, 384. The Court held that because the
greater charges were brought pretrial, there was no presumption of vindictiveness because
at that time-before the case has been finally prepared for trial-retaliation was unlikely
to be the reason for the change in charges. Id. at 384. This does not apply in the context of
preventing a successive prosecution because, by its very nature, the prosecutor's decision
takes place at the same time as in Blackledge-after a fully completed prior prosecution.
More recently, the presumption of vindictiveness was found in Thigpen v. Roberts, 468
U.S. 27 (1984). In Thigpen, the defendant had been convicted of reckless driving, driving
with a revoked license, driving on the wrong side of the road, and driving while intoxi-
cated. Id. at 28. He successfully appealed, and while the appeal was pending a grand jury
indicted him for the greater charge of manslaughter based on the same incident. Id. at 28-
29. The United States Supreme Court held that the institution of felony charges in this
case "suggested 'a realistic likelihood of "vindictiveness."'" Id. at 30 (quoting Blackledge,
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No court has yet applied these due process principles to pre-
vent a successive prosecution motivated by non-vindictive but
equally unconstitutional reasons-the desire to harass, practice,
or seek additional punishment.242 Yet the analysis and the pre-
sumption against reprosecution are fully applicable here. In the
successive prosecution context, as in the vindictiveness context,
the case has already proceeded to trial. The prosecution has al-
ready chosen its charges and prepared and presented its best
case. Thus, as in the vindictiveness context, there is unlikely to
be any legitimate reason for litigating the same facts again. As
Justice Scalia recognized in Dixon, prosecutors have nothing le-
gitimate to gain by doing so-the motivation is presumptively il-
legitimate, i.e., to seek additional punishment, to harass a defen-
dant, or to undo an acquittal.243 Of course, if the prosecution can
demonstrate legitimate motives, such as different jurisdictional
requirements, 244 different procedural rules,245 subsequent facts
that made initial prosecution impossible,2 46 or subsequent facts
that provide "objective information concerning identifiable con-
duct... occurring after... the original sentencing proceeding,"
this could rebut the presumption.247
417 U.S. at 27). On that basis, the Court recognized a presumption of vindictiveness, even
though a different prosecutor had been added to the prosecutorial team following the in-
dictment. Id. at 31.
242. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 354 (1990), seems to contain the Court's
only reference to the possibility of a due process protection against successive prosecution,
although it is an ill fit. Id. at 354. In Dowling, successive prosecutions were not really in-
volved; evidence of a robbery for which the defendant had been acquitted was admitted at
the defendant's trial for a second robbery on the question of identity. Id. at 344-45. The
Court rejected the defendant's double jeopardy claim. Id. at 348. It also rejected the defen-
dant's claim that the introduction of such evidence "contravenes a tradition that the gov-
ernment may not force a person acquitted in one trial to defend against the same accusa-
tion in a subsequent proceeding." Id. at 354. The Court held: "We acknowledge the
tradition, but find it amply protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. We decline to use
the Due Process Clause as a device for extending the double jeopardy protection to cases
where it otherwise would not extend." Id.; cf. United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60 (3d
Cir. 1990). In Esposito, the court held that acquittal on a RICO charge does not bar subse-
quent prosecution for predicate acts because they are not the "same offenses," but "[eft]
open without comment whether this scenario may present a situation of prosecutorial vin-
dictiveness or overreaching so severe that it violates the Due Process Clause." Id. at 67.
243. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 701 n.15 (1993).
244. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 530 (1990).
245. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 688.
246. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29 n.7 (1974) (citing Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442, 449 (1912)).
247. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969).
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Recognizing that "same offence" means what it says, the same
offense in law and fact, and allowing the courts to engage in tra-
ditional case-by-case fairness analysis, would protect all of the in-
terests identified as at stake in the circumstance of successive
prosecution and would rationalize the Court's confusing jurispru-
dence. Several factors could be taken into account in the analysis.
First, the courts could distinguish between post-acquittal and
post-conviction reprosecutions, allowing for greater protection for
an acquitted defendant, for whom the risk of wrongful conviction
is greater. Second, the. claimed reason or need for reprosecution
could be taken into account. Good reasons, such as different ju-
risdictional limitations or different required proof, might permit
reprosecution. However, bad reasons, such as trying to overcome
an acquittal, to drain the defendant's resources, or to impose ad-
ditional punishment, would not be acceptable. Under the "same-
elements" test, none of these reasons are considered. In England,
of course, this is precisely how the courts deal with successive
prosecutions that are not barred by the common law pleas.
C. A Supplemental Inherent Power Protection
Alternatively, the United States courts should rely on their in-
herent power to prevent abuse, as do the English courts, by re-
stricting unfair or manipulative successive prosecutions. In the
United States, several state supreme courts have taken this
route.24 Although no federal court has relied on its supervisory
power to prohibit a reprosecution, the courts' supervisory power
jurisprudence indicates that such reliance is appropriate.24 9
In McNabb v. United States,25 Justice Frankfurter observed
that the federal courts have "the duty of establishing and main-
taining civilized standards of procedure and evidence" that are
broader in scope than protections afforded by the Constitution or
statutes.25 1 In the more than fifty years since McNabb, the Su-
248. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. 1992).
249. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S, 499, 505 (1983); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
250. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
251. Id. at 340. In McNabb and its companion case, Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S.
350 (1943), incriminating statements were obtained by the police from suspects who were
held incommunicado and interrogated for several days until some of them confessed.
McNabb, 318 U.S. at 334-38; Anderson, 318 U.S. at 352-55. Although there was no proof
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preme Court and the lower federal courts have used their super-
visory power to create a variety of rules of procedure and evidence
to prevent government overreaching and to maintain the integ-
rity of the federal criminal justice process. 2 Although the source
of this power is not clear, its underlying rationale traditionally
has been understood to be to create a subconstitutional "fairness"
remedy to (1) cure the violation of recognized rights; (2) deter
government misconduct; and (3) preserve judicial integrity.253
Cases in which supervisory power has been exercised draw their
authority and inspiration from constitutional values but are not
limited by actual constitutional text. For example, in United
States v. Perez,254 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held that its rule prohibiting an increased sentence
after a successful appeal, which had been articulated as an exer-
cise of supervisory power, was not affected by various limitations
the Supreme Court had placed on its similar but due-process-
based holding in North Carolina v. Pearce.255 The Perez court ex-
plained:
In announcing the Pearce due process protection, and in modifying
Pearce thereafter, the Supreme Court has neither precluded a circuit
court from relying on its supervisory power to invalidate enhanced
sentences under certain circumstances, nor even suggested that con-
stitutional constraints are the only possible limits on a district
court's discretion when resentencing a defendant following a second
trial after a successful appeal. Indeed, in other contexts, the Su-
preme Court has affirmed the legitimacy of a federal court's supervi-
sory power, and its role in securing rights not guaranteed by the
Constitution.
256
of coercion, nor any suggestion that the defendants' constitutional rights were otherwise
violated, the Court held that prolonged detention that resulted in the defendants' confes-
sions was in "flagrant disregard" of statutory requirements mandating that a person taken
into custody be promptly arraigned before a judicial officer. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345. To
allow a conviction to stand based on unlawfully secured evidence would make "the courts
themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law." Id.
252. See Burton v. United States, 483 F.2d 1182, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1973), affd on
reh'g, 483 F.2d 1190 (citing thirty such cases); see also Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Su-
pervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority
of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1455-56 (1984) (stating that the exercise of
such power has "become commonplace in every circuit.... ").
253. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 n.8 (1980).
254. 904 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1990).
255. 395 U.S. 711 (1969); see also Perez, 904 F.2d at 148 (distinguishing the due process
based holding in Pearce).
256. 904 F.2d at 148 (citations omitted). This theory easily explains the decision in
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). As the Supreme Court suggested, access to a
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Although the Supreme Court has narrowed the permissible
scope of supervisory power over the years, none of the prohibi-
tions relate to double jeopardy protection. Moreover, the Court
has continuously reaffirmed the power of the federal courts to
control their own proceedings.5 7 First, the Court has refused to
allow the lower courts to exercise supervisory power over grand
jury proceedings.25 Second, reliance on supervisory power has
been disallowed where it conflicts with statutory rules or provi-
sions.259
The greatest limitation in this context has been the holding
that supervisory power is subservient to the harmless error rule
contained in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 260 How-
ever, a double jeopardy violation is a structural error that is not
subject to harmless error analysis.26' Similarly, Rule 8 permits
joinder of offenses if they are, inter alia, "based on the same act or
transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected to-
gether or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan."262 This
is entirely consistent with, and indeed would warrant, a prohibi-
tion against successive prosecution of such crimes. Finally, the
exercise of supervisory power has been disallowed if it conflicts
with or is broader than the Supreme Court's exclusionary rule ju-
risprudence, a limitation that is not applicable here.263
witness's prior statements for impeachment purposes is more than a rule of procedure; it
is a quasi-constitutional rule to protect the defendant's confrontation and due process
rights. See id. at 667-68. To the extent that criminal discovery protects values that inhere
in the right to confrontation, the right to effective representation, and the due process
right to a fair trial, the court's use of its supervisory authority to formulate rules to protect
these rights, although not explicitly required by the Constitution, is necessary to protect
these rights. See id. at 667-70.
257. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50 (1992) (finding that federal
courts have less power to fashion rules in grand jury proceedings); Young v. United States
ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (stating that there is inherent author-
ity to begin contempt proceedings).
258. See, e.g., Williams, 504 U.S. 793 at 46-47 (1992) (arguing that because of the
separation of powers, supervisory power may not be used to dismiss an indictment based
on prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence in the grand jury).
259. United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 1985).
260. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-56 (1988); United States
v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-12 (1983); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 52.
261. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970).
262. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8.
263. This limitation is based on the fact that the issue of deterrence and the balancing
of values necessary to determine the appropriateness of exclusion have been decided by
the Supreme Court, so that the lower courts may not substitute their own deterrence
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State courts have recognized an inherent judicial power to ad-
minister justice that includes prohibiting successive prosecution
of a defendant.264 For example, in State v. Kyles, the Louisiana
Court of Appeal recognized this power in deciding whether to
prevent a fifth trial of the defendant. 2" The court held that:
Trial judges have the inherent authority to terminate a prosecution
in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, where, as here, re-
peated trials, free of prejudicial error, have resulted in genuinely
deadlocked juries and where it appears that at future trials substan-
tially the same evidence will be presented and the probability of con-
tinued hung juries is great... requiring defendants to face addi-
tional juries with the continuing prospect of no verdict offendsS• •266
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
analysis. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736-37 (1980).
264. See, e.g., State v. Moriwake, 647 P.2d 705, 712 (Haw. 1982) (finding inherent
power to dismiss for deadlocked juries after one or more mistrials occurs); State v. Kyles,
706 So. 2d 611, 614 (La. App. 1998) (explaining the inherent authority possessed in the
factual context of a deadlocked jury); Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa.
1992) (barring a retrial because of prosecutorial misconduct); State v. Witt, 572 S.W.2d
913, 917 (Tenn. 1978) (holding that there is inherent authority to prevent retrials when
deadlocked juries cannot agree and it appears that at later trials very similar evidence
will be presented).
265. 706 So. 2d at 613.
266. Id. (quoting Witt, 572 S.W.2d at 916). The Court of Appeals of Louisiana based its
finding of inherent power on the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure which states:
A court possesses inherently all powers necessary for the exercise of its juris-
diction and the enforcement of its lawful orders, including the authority to is-
sue such writs and orders as may be necessary or proper in aid of its jurisdic-
tion. It has the duty to require that criminal proceedings shall be conducted
with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner and to so control the
proceedings that justice is done. A court has the power to punish for con-
tempt.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17 (West 1991). The court articulated several factors that
had been adopted in other jurisdictions to be considered by the trial courts:
1) the number of prior mistrials and reasons for them;
2) the character of the prior trials and similarity of evidence presented;
3) the likelihood of any substantially different result at a new trial;
4) the trial court's own evaluation of the strength of the parties' cases;
5) the conduct and diligence of counsels;
6) the seriousness of the offense;
7) the public's concern for the effective and definitive conclusion of criminal
prosecutions;
8) the status of the defendant; and
9) the impact of retrial upon the defendant in terms of untoward hardship
and unfairness.
Kyles, 706 So. 2d at 614 (citing State v. Sauve, 666 A.2d 1164, 1168 (1995)).
Ultimately, the court upheld the decisions of two lower courts not to bar the proceed-
ings, citing in particular the existence of new evidence of a confession by the defendant
2003]
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V. CONCLUSION
The characterization of the Supreme Court of the United
States's double jeopardy jurisprudence as "a veritable Sargasso
Sea"26 7 could not be more fitting. The Court has itself interpreted
the same precedents to yield two contrary results, depending on
its membership.
The Court's jurisprudence has attempted to define when two of-
fenses are sufficiently similar to trigger double jeopardy protec-
tion and to lay the boundaries for the balance of power between
the legislature that defines the crimes and the judicial branch.
The Court's sole reliance on a strict Blockburger analysis does not
fulfill that intent. Piecemeal litigation is not prevented by the
Blockburger test.
The intellectual inconsistency and inadequacy of protection
that stems from reliance only on the "same-elements" test could
be cured by recognizing that in some circumstances, due process
requires that factually related crimes be tried together. The Su-
preme Court of the United States could maintain its narrow view
of the double jeopardy clause-a "clear brightline rule enforced by
a special plea in bar before the second trial has even be-
gn ' -while supplementing that protection with a due process
and/or inherent power protection against successive punishment
that would protect the interests underlying the ban on successive
prosecution.
This is the route chosen by the English House of Lords. Per-
haps the Supreme Court of the United States could untangle it-
self by considering this straightforward and sensible approach.
that had not been available to the prosecution at prior trails. Id. at 614-15. For additional
sources on the English protection against successive prosecution, see CHOO, supra note
154, FRIEDLAND, supra note 154, and PArTENDEN, supra note 154.
267. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.).
268. Amar, supra note 27, at 1816.
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